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BOOK NOTE
THE HUMAN RIGHT TO INDIVIDUAL FREEDOM: A SYMPOSIUM ON WORLD
HABEAS CORPUS. Edited by Luis Kutner. Coral Gables, Florida: University of
Miami Press, 1970. Pp. 249.
In its classic and still primary sense,
international law is just what the name
implies: "law" concerning relations between states. It is made by the states
through treaty or long continued practice
(custom); it is followed by states; states
are the primary judges of its breach; it is
enforced by states, if it is enforced at all.
With only very limited exceptions, human
beings as such were not the concern of that
law. Pirates, as the main exception, were
considered enemies of all mankind, and
were thus subject to capture, trial and condemnation by any state, whether or not that
state's nationals had suffered loss or injury
at the hands of the pirate. In part, this
simply pointed up the norm: since the
pirate's acts were on the high seas, no state
had territorial jurisdiction over him, so any
state capturing him could take action
against him.
To the pirate, there has been added, in
general consensus, the war criminal. He too
may, in theory, be tried by any state with
any real interest in his crimes though it may
not have been affected directly by them.
In recent decades, there has been substantial demand by scholars and others in
many countries to expand this short, "negative" list of people with whom international
law has been directly concerned, to somehow make the law the guardian of individual human rights, at least rights of the most

basic kind. To some degree, international
law has been made responsive to these
demands, though in two different ways. On
the one hand, in addition to post-World
War II revision and expansion in the scope
of coverage of the humanitarian conventions dealing with prisoners of war, the sick
and injured, and with civilians in occupied
territory, there is now, for example, a convention describing and proscribing "genocide" (though the United States is not yet
a party). At the same time, however, proposals for an international criminal court
to deal with war crimes and the like have
received little favorable attention from the
nations.
In addition to UN concern with human
rights in specific countries at specific times,
we find other broad expressions of interest.
The Universal Declaration of Human
Rights, adopted by the UN General Assembly in 1948, for example, provides for
guarantees of life, liberty and security of
person with effective judicial remedies and
freedom from arbitrary arrest, detention
and exile (Articles 3, 8, 9) and the Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, now
open for ratification, has provisions to the
same effect in Article 9. An Optional Protocol to the Covenant permits, for Parties, a
very limited right of individual petition for
redress of grievances.
On the other hand, it is also true that
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institutions have occasionally existed in the
past to which individuals would bring
grievances, even against their own nations.
The record is spotty however. The Central
American Court of Justice, for example,
permitted persons, in some cases, to bring
actions against governments. The Court
only lasted for 10 years (1907-1917) and
in no actual case did an individual win.1
An Arbitral Tribunal in Upper Silesia between the wars was far more successful in
permitting individuals to bring actions
against member states.2 In more recent
times, in Europe, more progress has been
achieved. The European Convention for
the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms came into force in
1953 for most of the Western European
countries. 3 It establishes a Commission of
Human Rights and a Court of Human
Rights and provides an impressive bill of
rights for nationals of the member states.
While a strict rule of exhaustion of local
remedies is followed, individuals can bring
claims against their own states in proper
cases. 4 While limited in their activities,
these institutions do suggest that, in a
region where states are friendly and more
alike than unalike, limited international in-

1 See M. HUDSON, THE PERMANENT COURT OF
INTERNATIONAL JUSTICE 1920-1942, 52 (1943).
2 See G. KAECKENBEECK, INTERNATIONAL EXPERIMENT OF UPPER SILESIA (1942).

3 See, e.g., Comment, The European Commission
on Human Rights, 50 AM. J. INT'L L. 949
(1956); Note, The European Convention for the
Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental
Freedoms, 1958 BRIT. YRBK. INT'L L. 356.
4 The operations of the Commission and the
Court have been the subject of a number of books
and articles in recent years. See, e.g., A. H.
ROBERTSON,

HUMAN RIGHTS

INTERNATIONAL LAW (1968).
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stitutions with some power to rectify or at
least to call attention to inroads on agreed
human rights can be established.
Last fall, in the Introduction to his
Annual Report, 5 UN Secretary General
U Thant, pointed out that, theoretically,
the UN had little standing in situations
concerning the violation of human rights
within the frontiers of a country. He suggested that, while Members had done an
"admirable" job on human rights and the
"texts" existed, there was still no place
where an individual or group of individuals
could find recourse against oppression
within his own country. He felt the time
was ripe for governments in the UN to
give justice a world-wide dimension.
We have thus a picture of mounting
interest in some countries at least in the
status of the individual as a "subject" of
international law, together with the obviously disparate willingness of states to
subject any of their internal problems to
any form of international scrutiny. As one
of a number of endeavors to make the
states more responsive and more internationally responsible in matters of human
rights, Luis Kutner, an American lawyer
and legal educator, began some years ago
to formulate proposals for the establishment of a formal international right of
habeas corpus. The book under review,
The Human Right to Individual Freedom,'
presents, in its own terms, "Essays on the
Establishment of a World Court of Habeas
Corpus." While some of the essays appear

5 UN Doc. A/8401/add. 1 (1971).
6 THE HUMAN RIGHT TO INDIVIDUAL FREEDOM

(L. Kutner ed. 1970).
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to have been written for this symposium,
others are collected from other published
sources. All are by established authorities
in the field of international law, though the
pieces are highly uneven in content. And at
the end we are left with a plea, a call for
action, which is readily acceptable as an
aspiration, but which appears unlikely of
realization on a global scale while the present international system remains largely in
its present form.
As Arthur J. Goldberg, former Associate
Justice of the United States Supreme Court
and former U.S. Ambassador to the United
7
Nations, points out in a brief foreword,
habeas corpus, the "great writ," means to
us a procedure whereby "official detention
can be challenged and, if not justified on
the basis of valid laws, terminated."'8 As
he notes, without a procedural mechanism
of this type, many substantive rights remain
mere aspirations. Yet from the outset, he
suggests that there is, as yet, little universal "agreement on the content and extent
of international rights, much less on the
form of the necessary guarantees." 9 He
urges nevertheless that efforts go forward
so that, hopefully, meaningful (and one
must add, enforceable) standards for the
protection of individual human rights may
develop.
Is the concept embodied in the AngloAmerican writ of habeas corpus foreign to
the legal systems of other parts of the
world? Brief essays on the laws of Italy, 10

7 Id. 7-8.
S Id. 6.

Id. 7.
10 Chief Justice Silvio Tavolaro, Supreme Court
9
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12
Cambodia, 13
Uganda, 1 West Germany,
the Republic of China, 14 Colombia, 15 and
Ecuador, 16 and an interesting, lengthier
17
exposition of the law in Islamic countries
all suggest that the concept is entirely
compatible with notions of domestic (and,
presumably, international) order. Is it to
some degree prophetic, no doubt, that no
lawyers from Communist countries are included in this collection?

Several essays, often reprinted from
other sources, are devoted rather more to
the broader problem of protecting the individual through the development of international law and institutions than to habeas
corpus in particular. Roscoe Pound presents a brief overview of the nature of the
international legal system in an introduc-

of Cassation, Rome, A World Court of Habeas
Corpus. Id. 31-35.
11 Chief Justice Sir Udo Udoma, Some Thoughts
on World Habeas Corpus. Id. 35-43.

12 Chief Justice Gebhard Mtiller, Constitutional
Court, Fed. Rep. of Germany, Possibilitiesof the
World Habeas Corpus Movement. Id. 44-46.

Justice Muller notes the difficulties of a world
court of habeas corpus and argues for regional
courts. Id. 45.

33Chief of State Norodom Sihanouk, Cambodia's Viewpoint of World Habeas Corpus. Id.

47-48.
14 Ku Cheng-Kang, The Chinese Constitution
and the Habeas Corpus Principle. Id. 49-50.
15 Samuel B. Restrepo, The Idea of Habeas
Corpus in Colombia. Id. 51-54.
16 Gustavo Salgado, World Habeas Corpus: The
Ecuador View. Id. 189-200.
17 M. Cherif Bassiouni, Islam: Concept, Law,
and Habeas Corpus. Id. 98-116. Professor

Bassiouni notes that for Islamic countries, "the
limitations imposed by World Habeas Corpus on
the absolute powers of the ruler for the maintenance of the inalienable rights of man as
endowed by his Creator are wholly in communion
with Islam." Id. at 101.
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tory essay."' Justice William 0. Douglas
discusses well and at length the concern of
international law in general and of the
United Nations system with the needed
interaction of states, their growing interdependency, and the developing concern
for individual rights in the world and in
western Europe especially.' 9 Another Supreme Court Justice, William J. Brennan,
Jr., contributes a brief comment on the
utility of procedural mechanisms in defense
of human rights and suggests that American
lawyers take the lead in pressing toward
20
Short
a world court of human rights.
essays discussing the feasibility and utility
of international habeas corpus were also
contributed by Professors Myres S. Mc22
and
Dougal, 2' Harold D. Lasswell,
23
discusses
Schwelb
Egon
Quincy Wright;
human rights initiatives in and through the
United Nations, especially the Commission
on Human Rights; 24 Leonard v. B. Sutton,
in a well-documented essay, describes the
development of the writ in English and

Roscoe Pound, A Forward Step Toward a
Legal Order. Id. 11-15.
19 Justice William 0. Douglas, The Rule of Law
in World Affairs. Id. 59-84.
20 Justice William J. Brennan, Jr., International
Due Process and the Law. Id. 85-89. He notes
however that the State Department argued, in
the 1950's, that "with the many deep seated
political and ideological differences which exist
among the various nations, it would not appear to
18

be practical to seek meaningful agreement upon
a statute for such a court on the part of most
countries." Id. 88-89.
21

A Practicable Measure for Human Rights.

Id. 90-93.
The Bond Between Prescriptive Content and
Procedure. Id. 94-97.
23 Steps in the Realization of World Habeas
Corpus. Id. 159-69.
24 The United Nations and the Protection of
Personal Liberty. Id. 117-26.
22

American history and also goes into its
;
adaptation to the international scene.2
There is also a comparatively lengthy and
rather confused article commenting on the
development of an international penal law,
26
written by Tran Tam.
The editor, Luis Kutner, the father of the
notion of world habeas corpus, expresses
his views in an introductory Editor's Comment 27 and in The Legal Ultimate for the
Unity of Mankind,2 s a paper first presented
at the Conference of the Inter-American
Bar Association and the American Bar
Association at San Juan, Puerto Rico, in
May, 1965. In both, he describes other
international efforts aimed at developing
a standard of human rights and the origins
and continuing development of world habeas corpus. In the article, Mr. Kutner
also describes other national procedural
remedies akin to habeas corpus, such as the
Mexican "Amparo," and brings in analogies from other parts of the world. For
international law, he proposes circuit courts
of habeas corpus in nine regions of the
world, each region, hopefully, made up of
nations with more or less similar views of
sovereignty and human rights (and "legal
traditions, culture, religion, and history")..-..
A supreme court, to hear appeals from the
circuits, is also called for. Detained persons,
having exhausted local remedies would
seek redress before these circuit courts

25 Habeas Corpus-Its Past, Present, and Pos-

sible Worldwide Future. Id. 170-83.
26 The Struggle for International Rule of Law.
Id. 127-58.
27 World Habeas Corpus and the Rule of Law.
Id. 17-28.
28 Id. 201-40.
29 Id. 215.
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which could affirm the detention or order
a release of the petitioner. Details of approach and procedure are described in this
article and are worked out at length in a
Treaty-Statute of the International Court
of Habeas Corpus, which is included as an
Appendix. 30 Mr. Kutner is not so naive as
to believe that his proposals are likely to be
adopted soon, or universally; he argues
nevertheless that like-minded states could
readily create a circuit court in a region
and thus set the court system in motion.

least some international protection for individual human rights, efforts of this sort
are important in indicating alternate routes
which may, in time, be followed. While this
reviewer is far less sanguine than Mr.
Kutner in believing that many states, of any
persuasion, will be willing, in the foreseeable future, to open their internal processes
to any form of international scrutiny, it is
necessary to keep developing and suggesting pathways that states may, at some point,
be willing to try.

It is easy to agree with the old maxim
that, in any long journey, it is the first step
which counts. To aid in the growing interest
of many states, expressed in UN resolutions, proposed treaties, new European institutions, and elsewhere, in assuring at

Howard J. Taubenfeld*

Id. 241-49.
* Professor of Law, Southern Methodist University.
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